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OPINION OF THE COURT
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
Aaron Thomas appeals from a judgment of conviction and
sentence entered on April 26, 1994, sentencing him to a custodial
term of 169 months to be followed by a three-year term of
supervised release.

The sentence also included a provision for

restitution not implicated on this appeal.

The court imposed the

sentence on Thomas' conviction based on a plea of guilty to bank
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).

Through the

application of the career offender section of the Sentencing
Guidelines, his guideline range was established as 151 to 188
months predicated on a total offense level of 29.
Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1 (1993).

See U.S.

Without the career

offender designation, his total offense level would have been 22.
Thomas' career offender status was calculated on the
basis of two convictions, a 1987 burglary conviction in
Philadelphia and a 1992 robbery conviction in Bucks County,
Pennsylvania, both convictions having been based on pleas of
guilty.

As he did in the district court, Thomas challenges the

use of his 1992 conviction for robbery to fix his status as a
career offender.

He predicates this argument on the contentions

that he believed in 1992 that he was pleading guilty only to
theft and that the state judge failed to inform him of several of
his constitutional rights when he pleaded guilty.

The district

court found that the state convictions were valid.
We reject Thomas' argument.

In Custis v. United

States, 114 S.Ct. 1732 (1994), the Supreme Court held that except
when a conviction is obtained in violation of a defendant's right
to counsel, a defendant has no constitutional or statutory
grounds to attack collaterally the validity of previous state
convictions cited to enhance his sentence under the Armed Career
Criminal Act.

18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

We previously had held in

United States v. Brown, 991 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1993), that the
Sentencing Guidelines grant discretion to district courts to
entertain constitutional challenges at sentencing to prior
convictions used to establish criminal histories.

But we reached

this conclusion on the authority of a background note to U.S.
Sentencing Guideline § 4A1.2 which we construed to mean "that the
courts should work out their own procedural rules regarding
efforts by defendants to challenge convictions not previously
held unconstitutional."

Brown, 991 F.2d at 1166.

Thus, we did

not conclude in Brown that either the Guidelines or the
Constitution itself compelled us to permit constitutional
challenges to prior convictions used to establish criminal
histories under the guidelines.1
1

. The background note on which we relied in United States v.
Brown recited that the Sentencing "Commission leaves for court
determination the issue of whether a defendant may collaterally
attack at sentencing a prior conviction." This note was deleted

Custis, of course, has altered the situation with
respect to challenges to prior convictions.

Furthermore, we see

no principled way to distinguish a challenge to a prior
conviction used to justify an enhancement under the guidelines
from a prior conviction used to justify an enhancement under the
Armed Career Criminal Act.

Custis teaches that unless the

statute under which the defendant is sentenced explicitly
provides the right to attack collaterally prior convictions used
to enhance the sentence, no such right should be implied.
Custis, 114 S.Ct. at 1736 (contrasting the Armed Career Criminal
Act with other statutes "expressly permit[ting] repeat offenders
to challenge prior convictions that are used for enhancement
purposes").

In Brown itself we acknowledged that U.S. Sentencing

Guideline § 4A1.2 provides no such right explicitly, but only
authorizes courts to work out their own procedural rules.
991 F.2d at 1166.

Brown,

In the absence of such explicit authorization,

Guideline 4A1.2 stands in the same posture as the Armed Career
Criminal Act addressed in Custis.
Consequently, we will follow the lead of the Supreme
Court by holding that a district court, when sentencing a
(..continued)
effective November 1, 1993, when the Commission amended
application note 6 to section 4A1.2 to provide that "With respect
to the current sentencing proceeding, this guideline and
commentary do not confer upon the defendant any right to attack
collaterally a prior conviction or sentence beyond any rights
otherwise recognized in law (e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 851 expressly
provides that a defendant may collaterally attack certain prior
convictions)." We, however, are treating this case as though the
deleted note was still in the commentary and thus rely on Custis
and not the amendment to the commentary to reach our result.

defendant classified as a career offender under section 4B1.1,
cannot entertain a constitutional challenge to the underlying
convictions except in a case in which the defendant's right to
counsel had been denied.

In reaching this result, we join the

other courts of appeal which have declined to distinguish section
4B1.1 from the Armed Career Criminal Act for the purpose of
considering challenges to prior convictions.
Garcia,

F.3d

,

United States v.

, No. 94-5028 (10th Cir. 1994); United

States v. Killion, 30 F.3d 844, 846 (7th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Jones, 28 F.3d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Jones, 27 F.3d 50, 51-52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 377
(1994).

See also United States v. Munoz, 36 F.3d 1229, 1237-38

(1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Ullyses-Salazar, 28 F.3d 932,
939 (9th Cir. 1994).
In addition to distinguishing section 4B1.1 from the
Armed Career Criminal Act, Thomas seeks to avoid Custis on two
other bases.

First, he contends that inasmuch as the government

did not urge in the district court that he could not challenge
the 1992 conviction, it cannot make that contention now.

We

reject this contention because the Supreme Court decided Custis
after the court sentenced Thomas, and the government was not
obliged to make an argument in the district court barred by
Brown.

We also observe that the government raises Custis to

affirm rather than to reverse the judgment from which the appeal
was taken.

We think that whatever might be true in other

situations, in this unusual case in which the Supreme Court
effectively changed the law after the completion of the district

court proceedings, the government should be permitted to rely on
the new ruling to uphold the district court's judgment.
Second, Thomas contends that Custis does not preclude a
challenge to a prior conviction itself in a state or federal
habeas corpus proceeding nor, in his view, does it preclude a
federal habeas corpus attack to an enhanced sentenced predicated
on an invalid prior conviction.

See Nichols v. United States,

114 S.Ct. 1921, 1937 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Custis,
114 S.Ct. at 1746 (Souter, J., dissenting).
reason to address those possibilities.

We, however, have no

The only issue before us

is whether at the time of the sentencing the district court may
entertain constitutional challenges to underlying convictions
used to enhance sentences.

We conclude that, except in cases in

which a conviction was obtained in violation of a defendant's
right to counsel, we should follow Custis and hold that such
challenges are precluded in cases under section 4B1.1.
The judgment of conviction and sentence of April 26,
1994, will be affirmed.

